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Abstract 
      The European Union aims at being an ethical actor on the global arena and the EU 
development-policy is directed towards achieving long-term socio-economic development, with a 
specific focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, where development is showing little progress, and food 
security and agricultural development is at the top of the agenda. The EU is both the biggest market 
and the biggest aid-donor for African countries. 
      In this thesis the focus is on to what degree the Unions approach to this can be argued to be 
ethical. The theoretical frame is that of Darrel Moellendorf’s approach to institutional justice, and to 
be able to state whether or not the EU approach is just, one need to establish the receiving ends 
perception of this, and the power-relations embedded in this. The method for doing this is a single-  
case study, namely with justice as the dependent variable, where the EU’s documents on food 
security as well as the African Union’s documents on the same will be analysed. 
      The analysis shows that to a certain extent institutional justice is present, but that the power-
relations embedded in the global trade-system, hinders full institutional justice in this area. 
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1. Introduction 
      If one, like me, is a great fan of superheroes, one will know that the title of this thesis is 
borrowed from the first issue of Spiderman
1
. The world of superheroes is easy to relate to; we 
instantly know a hero when we see one, and it is easy to tell the difference between doing good and 
doing harm. Now, in the real world there are rarely a uniform definition of heroes and villains, right 
and wrong. Perhaps because of this, ethics understood as the attempt to answer the question “how 
ought we to live?” goes back to the earliest days of philosophy2. Ethics then can be summarised as 
the study of right actions versus wrong actions. And like any other theoretical field, there are many 
different views on what the right answer ought to be, and the dichotomy good and evil, is rarely as 
clearly cut as it is in fiction.  
      With the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union 
(EU), the goal was, according to High Representative Javier Solana, to become “a credible force for 
good” on a global scale3.There is a strong consensus, within the institutions of the Union, that the 
EU is and should be a normative actor with the capacity as well as responsibility, to spread and 
secure development, good governance, human rights and democracy
4
. To be an ethical actor on the 
global arena, a normative power securing universal values. 
The EU’s discourse on its own external role is, in the words of Lisbeth Aggestam “articulated in a 
discourse of universal ethics which defines the EU as a ‘power for good’”5.  
     But even though the EU labels itself an ethical actor, ethics as the theoretical lens through which 
one studies the EUs foreign relations, is not very common. Perhaps this is a result of the fact that 
ethics is often discussed on a philosophical level, as opposed to being of practical interest
6
.   
      I have a strong belief that when the Union argues to be an ethical actor, it is of importance that 
this influences both its policies and practices. Not from a philanthropic point-of-view, but rather 
from the viewpoint that it will affect the Union, as well as the third party, be that positive or 
negative, in several cross-cutting fields.  
       When the EUs financial allocation for the period 2011-2013, alone and solely on food-security-
issues in other parts of the world, was €749 million7, the outcomes matter; they may matter for 
different reasons depending on your position, but they are not to be neglected.  
                                                          
1
 Amazing Fantasy #15, August 1962 
2
 Heather Widdows, Global Ethics an introduction, (Acumen: Durham), 2011, p. 4-5 
3
 Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP and ESDP, autumn 2007 
4
 Article 21 TEU 
5
  Lisbeth Aggestam, Introduciton: ethical power Europe?, International Affairs 84: 1 (2008) pp. 1–11, p. 1 
6
 David Miller, Political Philosophy A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford University Press: Oxford), 2003, p. 9-10 
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1.1 The EU and Distributive Justice 
     European Union development policy is directed towards helping achieve the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Progress has been made but it has been uneven, and 
especially so relating to Africa, where nearly 80%
8
 of malnourished people live in fragile situations. 
In most parts of the world, rates of hunger and malnutrition have fallen significantly in recent years, 
but those in Africa have shown little improvement
9
.  Parallel with this, the EU is the biggest export 
market for African products, as well as the biggest donor of development aid
10
. 
The global economic developments during the recent years have resulted in food security re-
entering the debates and has gained policy attention in development cooperation.   
      The high level of undernourished people in the world has, according to the Commission, been 
influenced by three factors: 1) a long-standing relative neglect of agriculture and food security by 
governments and international agencies, 2) the worldwide economic crisis, and 3) the volatility of 
food prices over the last few years. As a result, the first Millennium Development Goal on the 
eradication of poverty and hunger (MDG 1), to half, between 1990 and 2015, the number of people 
suffering from hunger
11
, is likely to be missed by a sizeable margin, particularly in many sub-
Saharan African countries
12
. Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa is as persistent as it is widespread. 
According to the African Union (AU), efforts to reduce hunger in the region have been hampered 
by a range of natural as well as human-induced disasters
13
.  
      The African Union states that production and pastoral livelihoods in Africa face multiple threats 
related to trans-boundary disease, water shortages and climate change among others related to trade 
barriers and phytosanitary issues
14
. In other words the two Unions detect similar issues to be the 
reasons for this unfortunate development, but there are also small deviances in their analyses. The 
matter of trade barriers will therefore be of particular interest in this thesis, since this is a topic that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
7
 Brussels, 21 December 2010 Document C/2010/9263 FOOD SECURITY THEMATIC PROGRAMME THEMATIC 
STRATEGY PAPER (UPDATE) and MULTIANNUAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 2011-2013, p. 5 
8
 The African Union/New Partnership for Africa’s Development, (2009), Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP) Pillar III Framework for African Food Security (FAFS), (New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Secretariat, South Africa), p.3 
9
 The African Union/New Partnership for Africa’s Development, (2009), p. 3 
10
 Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, development cooperation, available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african_union/eu_african_union/development_cooperation/ viewed: 04-03-13 
11
 Brussels, 25.1.2006, COM(2006) 21 final, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT A THEMATIC STRATEGY FOR FOOD SECURITY Advancing the food 
security agenda to achieve the MDGs, p.4 
12
 FOOD SECURITY THEMATIC PROGRAMME THEMATIC STRATEGY PAPER,  2011-2013, p. 6 
13
 The African Union/New Partnership for Africa’s Development, (2009), p.3 
14
 The African Union/New Partnership for Africa’s Development, (2009), p. 5 
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often comes up when discussing socio-economic development and the AU clearly sees it as one of 
the main-reasons, situated within the political field, for its food-security situation.  
      According to the Commission distributive justice, in the sense of securing development and 
fighting hunger, is at the heart of the EU foreign policy
15
.      
       In 2006, as part of an effort to rationalise and simplify the existing legislative framework 
governing external actions of the Community, the European Commission proposed a number of 
thematic programmes, one being the Thematic Programme on Food Security, the one being the 
main focus of this study. The goal with the thematic programmes was to provide distinctive value 
added and comprise activities complementing geographical programmes, which is the prime 
framework for Community cooperation with third countries
16
. 
      To simplify communication in the development field, and to provide a single contact point for 
stakeholders inside and outside the EU to deal with – a new Directorate-General (DG) was 
established in 2011; EuropeAid
17
.  
      With a focus on values EuropeAid is explicitly working as an instrument for spreading 
European values and norms; the European way of ordering how one ought to arrange society and 
life. 
      Even this, in international relations, rather new topic of distributive justice, has a long history in 
political thought. When we argue about international affairs we draw directly or indirectly on 
established traditions of ethical discourse
18
. 
      The EU’s normative power is often an issue in politics as well as in research. According to Ian 
Manners, this normative power is to be understood as the ‘power over opinion’ and the EU has gone 
further towards linking its foreign affairs tightly to a “catalogue of norms which come closer to 
those of the European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR) and the 
universal declaration of human rights (UDHR) than most other actors in world politics”19. Manners 
argues that the EU’s normative power stems from its ability to shape norm diffusion, and work 
                                                          
15
 EuropeAid, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/index_en.htm viewed 04-03-13 
16
 ATHEMATIC STRATEGY FOR FOOD SECURITY Advancing the food security agenda to achieve the MDGs, p. 3 
17
 EuropeAid, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/index_en.htm viewed 04-03-13 
18
 Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (ed.), Traditions of International Ethics, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge), 
2002, p. 1 
19
 Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?  JCMS 2002 volume 40. Number 2. Pp.235-58 p. 
241 
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towards ‘normalizing’ its core norms, in international relations 20, and that the Union seeks to 
redefine international norms in its own image
 21
. 
      Even though ‘normative power Europe’ has evolved into a big field of research, and ethics is 
often mentioned, ethical analyses of the EU has until rather recently gained little interest. Relations 
between the EU and Africa have been subject to research for a longer time, especially with a focus 
on trade and economic relations, as well as diplomatic relations. But according to Siegmar Schmidt, 
the African perception of the EU is an under-researched field
22
. 
      My intensions with this thesis are to combine the concepts of ethics and power, by using 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall’s definitions of power, which will be described later in the 
methodology chapters, and apply these on a case-study within the field of EU foreign policy, with a 
focus on long-term socio-economic development, specifically concerning food security.  
 
1.2 Focus of this thesis 
      The main area of interest in this thesis is the clash between the EU as a self-stated ‘force of 
good’ and the Commission’s focus on food insecurity as one of the focal points of EU foreign 
policy 
23
, and the power-relations this establishes and preserves.  
      In 2006, the Commission established that it was estimated that 815 million people were 
‘chronically’ food insecure in the developing world. Despite progress in reducing hunger at global 
level, persistent food insecurity remains elusive in Sub-Saharan Africa. Linkages between food 
insecurity and conflict, poor governance and the HIV/AIDS pandemic raise profound challenges for 
national governments, donors and civil society alike
24
. The scope of this thesis does not permit that 
I include these topics, but it is important to note that food security in this broader sense cannot be 
limited to a philanthropic matter of ‘the poor starving children of Africa’, as it is sometimes 
portrayed in our part of the world. Food security is not just a matter of individual life or death; it is a 
global security-issue
25
,
26
,
27
. 
                                                          
20
 Manners, ( 2002), p. 243-244 
21
 Manners, ( 2002), p. 252 
22
 Siegmar Schmidt, Soft Power or Neo-colonialist Power? - African Perceptions of the EU, Review of European 
Studies, Vol. 4. No. 3; July 2012, p. 101 
23
 FOOD SECURITY THEMATIC PROGRAMME THEMATIC STRATEGY PAPER,  2011-2013, p 6 
24
 ATHEMATIC STRATEGY FOR FOOD SECURITY Advancing the food security agenda to achieve the MDGs, p. 4 
25Oliver Bakewell, ‘Keeping Them in Their Place’: the ambivalent relationship between development and migration in 
Africa, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, Working papers, 2007, paper 8, p. 2  
26
 Niagale Bagoyoko and Marie V. Gilbert, The Linkage between Security, Governance and Development: the 
European Union in Africa, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, 789–814, May 2009,  p. 789 
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      The statement is that food insecurity is both a cause and a consequence of absolute poverty, and 
that the issue is not sufficiently recognised either as a development objective or as an indicator of 
economic and social progress, because it is often related to emergency-aid, and thereby its multi-
dimensional nature is overlooked. The Commission therefore argues for a long-term structural 
approach to tackling the root causes of food insecurity
28
. 
      To simplify it, the over-all goal is to integrate food security objectives within long-term and 
broad-based poverty reduction policies and strategies. 
       Building on this, the EU prioritizes cooperation in sustainable agriculture in the EU's long-term 
development assistance
29
.  
       The argument, by the Commission, is that it is cost effective; addressing the root causes of 
recurrent crises is not only better than only responding to the consequences of crises, it is also much 
cheaper.  They clearly state an economic explanation for long-term development perspectives, 
arguing that “when the world is experiencing an economic and budgetary downturn, the budgets of 
both partner countries and donors are coming under increased pressure to show that they deliver the 
maximum impact for the funds that are made available”30. 
      I find an interesting paradox in the fact that the EU has developed such a strong focus on food 
security through agricultural development, in its long-term socio-economic development goals for 
Africa, while the Union’s own Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is still criticized for being 
distorting trade
 31
 and hindering economic development, as well as food security
32
, and at the same 
time the African Union states that trade barriers are part of the problem. Can it really then be argued 
that the EU is truly ‘doing good’ in the world? Can the EU claim to be a promoter of justice? 
     These questions are interesting in themselves, but perhaps even more interesting is how we can 
use the answers to these questions, and what that teach us about the European Union and the field of 
Global Political Economy. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the institutional justice of the Union’s 
approach to food security, and look at the power-relations in this area. The goal is to lay a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
27
 Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? In  Michael E. Brown et al (ed.), New Global Dangers 
Changing Dimensions of International Security, 2004, (THE MIT PRESS: Cambridge), p. 251 
28
ATHEMATIC STRATEGY FOR FOOD SECURITY Advancing the food security agenda to achieve the MDGs, p 4 
29
 Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, Main missions of DEVCO Directorates & Units, 
Draft edited and translated on 21/12/2012 on the basis of the 14/03/2012 version , p. viewed 22-04-2013 
30
 Brussels, 3.10.2012  COM(2012) 586 final , COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL THE EU APPROACH TO RESILIENCE: LEARNING FROM 
FOOD SECURITY CRISES, p. 2-3 
31
 The Nordic Africa Institute, The Impact of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Reform on Africa-EU Trade in Food 
and Agricultural Products, Special Issue on the EU Africa Partnership Strategy, Policy Notes 2009/7 
32
 International Food Policy Research Institute, 2012 Global Food Policy Report, p. 60 
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theoretical frame for future studies on policy-making in fighting hunger and promoting 
development.     
      In a recent report the International Food Policy Research Institute concludes that addressing 
emerging global poverty, hunger, and malnutrition challenges requires prudent evidence-based 
policymaking, and that the capacity for generating evidence remains a major constraint in the policy 
process
 33
. In the past three decades, discussion has increased regarding evidence-based 
policymaking in an attempt to replace “ideologically-driven politics with rational decision making”. 
The definition of evidence-based policymaking is still evolving in the literature and can refer to the 
use of pilot program evaluations conducted by governments or research conducted by independent, 
politically neutral organizations to inform policy. In general, it refers to the transformation of a 
policy process to a more systematic, rational, decision-making approach to designing policy
34
.   
      These policy-issues are not directly linked to this thesis, but in relations to policy-evaluation the 
challenge is to develop methods of assessment that emphasize learning rather than expressing 
summary judgements
35
, and I wish to use the outcome of this thesis, for contributing to the former. 
Thus, the aim of the thesis is two-fold: 
 Primary: a power analysis of the institutional justice in the EU’s Food Security Thematic 
Programme, that can lay ground for; 
 Secondary: provide a theoretical framework for a future evidence-based study of the 
outcome of the Food Security Thematic Programme  
  
 
1.2.1 Research-question 
 
When looking at EuropeAid’s approach to the long-term goals on Food Security, from the 
perspectives of institutional justice and power, to what extent can the policy then be argued to be 
ethical? 
    
                                                          
33
 Suresh Chandra Babu & Paul Dorosh, Measuring Food Policy Research Capacity, Indicators and Typologies, 
Partnership, Impact and Capacity Strengthening Unit Development Strategy and Governance Division, IFPRI 
Discussion Paper 01263 April 2013, p. v 
34
 Chandra Babu & Dorosh, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01263 April 2013, p. 1 
35
 Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation, (Prentice Hall: London), 1998, p. 20 
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1.3 Definitions of food security 
      When talking about food security throughout this thesis, I am referring to the long-term socio-
economic development related to food security. Since food security can be talked of in many terms, 
such as securing safe products through health-inspections, or securing a minimum intake of 
nutrition etc., I believe it is important to establish that these are not issues dealt with in this thesis. 
This is also the reason why emergency-aid is not included. Part of the reason for the focus on long-
term socio-economic perspective, is that development has become a central focus of attention of 
world leaders. This growing interest is not only (as in the past) because of the moral dilemma in 
these issues, but perhaps mainly because in a globalised world underdevelopment is seen as 
contributing significantly to global instability
36
. 
      In 1996 Heads of State and Government gathered at the World Food Summit at the invitation of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, to form a common commitment to 
achieving food security for all. The outcome was the Rome Declaration on World Food Security, 
and its preamble states that the problems of food insecurity have global dimensions. It further states 
that a peaceful and stable political, social and economic environment is the essential foundation 
which will enable States to give adequate priority to food security and poverty eradication. 
According to the Rome Declaration on World Food Security, Food security exists when "all people, 
at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”37.  
     At the 17th session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development the urgent need to 
address food security and agricultural development was discussed, as well as trade-related issues
38
.  
 
1.4 Other research in this area 
      While the aim of being a force, or power, ‘for good’ may seem admirable, it has provoked great 
debates on the role of the EU in the world, being critiqued from almost every theoretical perspective 
and angle within the fields of political science and international relations. From François Duchêne 
who, when talking about the EU, claimed that traditional military power had given way to 
progressive economic power as the means to exert influence in international relations, whereas 
                                                          
36
 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, (Oxford University Press: Oxford), 2007,  p. 4 
37
 Rome Declaration on World Food Security 
38
 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, Report on the seventeenth session, (16 May 2008 and 4-15 
May 2009), Economic and Social Council Official Records, 2009, Supplement No. 9, viewed at 16-04-2013, available 
at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.17/2009/19(SUPP)&Lang=E 
  
13 
Hedley Bull, partly as a response to this, argued that “Europe is not an actor in international affairs, 
and does not seem likely to become one…”,39 over newer contributions to the field, where Barry 
Buzan and Richard Little argues that the EU has come close to global, structural transformation 
through its “great European experiment with post-Westphalia political economy […] its many day-
to-day problems notwithstanding”40, to the wide range of studies on the EU as a “soft power” 41. 
These studies on the power of the EU in its foreign affairs, focuses on different areas where the 
concept of power is of importance.  
      As mentioned in the previous chapters, the political consensus on development of today is that it 
is a cross-cutting issue, with effects in both the economic, political and security-spheres in the 
global arena.  
      Food security is, in research, commonly dealt with at the technical levels of production and 
research, or regarding aid, and when it comes to development-policies, at the national level. There 
is not, yet, much research conducted on the global commitment to long-term food-security issues at 
the political level.  
      International relations, and EU in particular, has been rigorously studied since the first steps 
taken towards a European Union, and the lenses through which it has been studied, are many. 
During the last couple of decades, parallel with the growing focus on human rights and 
development, ethics has regained territory in the field. 
      Parallel with this development a growing interest in treating power as a multi-facetted concept 
has evolved, where the traditional international relations-approach with power seen as the exclusive 
province of realism, is contested
42
. The extension of sovereignty from the West to the developing 
world opened up for more states to represent, as well as claim, their own interests, and according to 
Barnett and Duvall, at the same time the emergence of a human rights discourse, to mention just 
one of these new interests, helped to make possible the very category of human rights activists who 
give voice to human rights norms. Therefore they argue that analysis of power in international 
relations must include a consideration of how social structures and processes generate differential 
social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals
43
. 
                                                          
39
 Quoted in Manners, ( 2002), p. 237 
40
 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History remaking the study of international relations, 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford), 2000, p. 352 
41
 See for example Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Soft Power, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 1990), 153-
171, for a famous example  
42
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in International Politics, International Organization 59, Winter 2005, 
pp. 39-75, p. 40 
43
 Barnett and Duvall,(2005), p. 40-42 
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      The combination of ethics and power, then, will serve as the frame for this study of whether or 
not the EU is acting just, through its institutional arrangements in relation to the long-term 
development of Sub-Saharan Africa, and an empirical meta-analysis of the outcome of this. I find 
that these two concepts go rather well hand-in-hand. Normative Power Europe is a field that has 
worked with similar issues, without necessarily mentioning ethics. The main reason for the interest 
in ethics per se, is that the EU often labels itself an ethical actor in the global arena.       
2. Methodology  
      Now we move on to the methodological framework for this thesis. Methodology denotes an 
investigation of the concepts, theories and method required for reasoning on this subject
44
.  As the 
research-question indicates through its focus on perception of justice, the methodology of this thesis 
is within the constructivist field
45
.  
      Therefore the following chapters give an introduction to, first, the ethical approach I will apply 
to the study and later on, the concepts of power I will apply.  In the last section of this chapter I 
provide a short summary on how these concepts will be dealt with, and together provide a combined 
theoretical and methodological approach to my study. 
      Lastly this chapter with an elaboration on choices in method and the data I have chosen for 
analysis.  
     Throughout the following analysis, in later chapters, I will intertwine the empirical analysis with 
a deeper theoretical discussion. Further in-depth explanations of the theories will therefore be added 
on as it suits the empirical analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 Jonathon W. Moses and Torbjørn L. Knutsen, Ways of Knowing, Competing Methodologies in Social and Political 
Research, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York), 2007,  p. 5 
45
 Moses & Knutsen, (2007), p. 11 
  
15 
2.1 Theory - Ethics in International Relations 
      This chapter gives a short introduction to the development of ethics in IR, before describing the 
approach that will work as my theoretical and methodological framework, in this thesis. Because 
saying that justice is of cardinal importance to good governance is one thing; saying what justice 
really means is something else
46
. This issue is the main focus of the chapters that follows. 
      International society as we know it today is composed for the most part of self-governing nation 
states; a relatively modern phenomenon, and up until the twentieth century, the world was 
dominated by empires, not nation states
47
. But during the nineteenth century, nationalist aspirations 
introduced a new ethical notion –the rights of peoples; claiming the right of self-determination of 
peoples, in terms of ethnic groups. The nation state thus became an expression of an ethical ideal – 
and at the same time most of the conflicts during the twentieth century can in large measure be seen 
to be an outcome of the success of this new ethical notion
48
.  
      Gordon Graham states that, today, this affects almost all thinking about ethics in international 
affairs, because it has been extended beyond the bare right of statehood, to include rights which 
protect and promote it, relating to humanitarian intervention, distributive justice and the 
environment. Today, these are amongst the grandest subjects of ethics in international affairs
49
. 
             
2.1.1 Different ethical approaches in International Relations  
      Understanding the moral theories is an essential first step in making and understanding 
arguments. Understanding moral theories is not merely an academic exercise but essential on the 
ground
50
. The study of ethics involves asking what principles and practices are considered 
important, by whom and why. Normative ethics focuses on the impact these beliefs have on actions 
taken, in order to understand which actions are considered right or wrong
51
. Essentially there are 
three main approaches to moral theories; utilitarianism, deontology (Kantianism) and virtue theory, 
which prioritize different values and use different methodologies to determine right and proper 
solutions
52
 
53
.       
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      Well aware that ethics is a rather uncommon theoretical framework, it is important to say a few 
words about these three main approaches. Even though they will not be the main frame for this 
thesis, I will refer to them, and therefore it is important to know the basic line of thinking within 
them. 
      Virtue ethics emphasizes the moral character of social groups: The establishment of virtues 
through education, religion or other social practices clearly forms an important part of 
understanding the shared basis of, what is perceived, as ‘the common good’ 54. Virtue ethics is, in 
contrast to utilitarianism and Kantianism, more strongly “agent-focused”55 and context sensitive; 
and in this lies the danger of relativism
56
.  
      Utilitarianism, along with deontology, is one of the two most prominent types of universalism, 
when it comes to theories on ethics. It is a form of consequentalism; when working out whether an 
action or practice is morally right or wrong, it is the consequences that determine the outcome. 
What matters are the results; all other factors are irrelevant
57
. Utilitarianism in its purest form is not 
only difficult to fit with common moral institutions, but also with situations that have derived from 
relationships or special claims
58
. 
      Named after Immanuel Kant, Kantianism derives from deontology and duty-ethics, but is 
neither concerned with consequences, nor is it a maximizing philosophy. It does require that all 
similar cases are treated similarly and insists on consistency; but it can take account of special 
relationships. A Kantian would think it right and proper to respect duties that arise from 
relationships
59
. Here morally right acts are those that one ought to do irrespective of anything else; 
they are “categorical”, and can be recognized and understood as binding by all rational beings if 
that action could be accepted to be universal
60
. 
      
2.2 Institutional cosmopolitanism 
      Now that I have given a short introduction to the main theories within ethics, it can be argued 
that the EU shares traits with all of them; analysis of principles and actions focuses on the origins 
and practices of EU external actions, whereas an emphasis on impact requires wider reading of the 
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way in which policies affect the targets of such action. Therefore, to be able to analyse the outcome 
of a programme such as the Food Security Thematic Programme, utilitarian ethics would be the 
most appropriate, with its focus on consequences. But at the same time, the EU focuses very much 
on Kantian principles of rules, institutions and laws. There is, in other words, not a clear ethical 
approach applied by the EU. This is in no way surprising, since theories are after all theories, and 
reality is rarely that clear-cut.  
      To be able to do an ethical analysis of the EUs actions in the development field, I have chosen 
an approach which combines the focus on institutions with a focus on consequences. The reason for 
this is that to consider non-state institutions, such as the EU, is to reject the traditional divide in 
political theory that has classified “ethics” as distinct from “justice”, with “ethics” concerned with 
individual obligations and “justice” with the obligations of institutions61. 
            Despite similarities, it is important to note that moral theories and political theories are not 
directly parallel
62
. In moral discourse the focus is on duties of individual agents to other individual 
agents, whereas in political discourse obligations are seen primarily in terms of political 
structures
63
. To be able to interconnect these easier, I have chosen the ethical perspectives of one of 
the most prominent ethicists working on institutional justice, Darrel Moellendorf, whom is working 
with ethics and political structures on a highly interconnected level.  
    Therefore the main theoretical frame for this thesis will be institutional cosmopolitanism, from 
the views of Moellendorf, focusing mainly on the duties of institutions, policy structures and on 
mechanisms of governance
64
. This will be combined with an empirical meta-analysis of the 
perception of the EU’s programme, in the case-study, to see whether or not the institutions can be 
claimed to act just.  
 
2.3 Moellendorf’s institutional cosmopolitan justice 
      Moellendorf adopts an institutional cosmopolitanism based on a distinction between moral 
duties in general and duties of justice. Thus he separates the element of “justice” from the broader 
“ethics”. By separating justice and other moral duties in this way, he is making sure that the 
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cosmopolitan commitment to respecting all individuals is not confused with the moral debate about 
impartiality and special duties
65
.  
2.3.1 Social justice 
      According to Moellendorf, social justice concerns the moral nature of the institutions that 
mediate interactions among persons. He, for the sake of simplicity, uses the term justice as 
equivalent to social justice
66
- even though social justice may be narrower in scope than justice per 
se - and so shall I, for the same reasons.  
      He argues that duties of cosmopolitan justice exist because the conditions that gives rise to 
duties of justice, namely, the appropriate form of association, exists on a global level. He takes it a 
step further by arguing that this claim is also compatible with the view that we have special duties 
of justice to compatriots
67
. 
      The inherent dignity of persons is, in Moellendorf’s view, a useful place to start a justification 
of global egalitarianism
68
. Because of the wide appeal that these ideas have in international human 
rights documents as well as treaties, I too would argue that there is a universal, at least normative, 
acceptance of this notion.  
        Darrel Moellendorf is interested in matters of social justice in the sense of whether the 
principles and institutions that dominate our social and political life are just. His conception of 
justice is sometimes called an institutional conception of justice, since he states that if person A 
owes a duty of justice to person B, then A has a duty to observe the established institutional 
principles that ensure B is being treated justly, or to advocate for the establishment of just 
principles. He points out that duties of justice differ from more general moral duties in that two 
distinguishing properties of duties of justice are: (1) duties of justice are generated by associational 
relations; and, (2) they are duties requiring action toward persons indirectly insofar as they require 
obeying or advocating just institutions or principles to govern the association. By that he argues that 
duties of justice are moral requirements of a special sort that we owe to other persons, but not to 
all
69
. 
      Moellendorf argues that duties of justice arise between persons when activities such as politics 
or commerce bring persons into association. These associations may or may not be voluntary and 
intentional; this is especially the case when economic activity affects those not directly involved in 
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it. He uses an example where C and D are involved in commercial activity that causes serious harm 
to D’s neighbours, without either C or D knowing it. In this case, C and D are in association with 
D’s neighbours.  
      Moellendorf’s argument is that the fact that people are associated makes it sensible to question 
whether the institutions, or principles that govern their association, are just
70
. 
        Duties of justice do not justify the existence of an association; they assume its existence. The 
association in itself does not need moral justification, in order to render associative duties consistent 
with the moral equality of all persons. Hence he argues that one can start with the normatively 
unjustified fact of association and derive duties limited to associates that are perfectly consistent 
with the moral equality of all persons
71
. 
 
2.3.2 The principle of associational justice 
      The principle of associational justice states that duties of justice exist between persons who have 
a moral duty of equal respect to one another due to being co-members of an association that is  
 relatively strong,  
 largely non-voluntary,  
 constitutive of a significant part of the background rules for the various relationships of their 
public lives, and  
 Governed by norms that can be subject to human control.  
 
With respect to the first, an association is strong to the extent that it is (a) enduring, (b) 
comprehensively governed by institutional norms and (c) regularly affecting the highest order moral 
interests of the persons associated. With respect to the second, an association is non-voluntary to the 
extent that there is no reasonable alternative to participating in the association
72
. 
Equality of opportunity in the global economic association is directed towards ensuring that 
differences in initial condition do not affect the opportunities of persons
73
. 
      In this theoretical frame, four plausible exceptions are incorporated, that could support a 
difference between the pro tanto endorsement of a principle of equality and a complete justification 
of a principle in particular cases:  
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(1) Some persons could deserve to have their interests treated less well because of something they 
have done to harm the interests of others; 
(2) Some persons could voluntarily consent to lesser realization of their interests or to taking certain 
risks of their outcome; 
(3) There might be difference in morally relevant needs requiring more resources to satisfy; 
(4) Offering incentives that produce differential outcomes could benefit everyone in comparison to 
their condition under equality. In any particular case the prima facie principle of equality might not, 
then, be appropriate because of one of these exceptions
74
.  
      These exceptions will be of particular interest when combined with the concepts of power, 
presented later on. 
        Moellendorf suggests that we should suppose we have what he calls a common good association. 
This is an association that by the joint effort of its members produces goods and powers, useful to the 
members, to which no person has a pre-associational moral entitlement. What we have here is a prima facie 
principle of equality under common good institutions, suggesting a method for considering whether 
distributive inequalities between people who share common and unavoidable institutions are all-things-
considered just despite their violation of the prima facie equality principle: one must consider whether the 
exceptions to equality apply. Moellendorf argues that it is highly unlikely these exceptions apply when 
considering the bulk of current global inequality
75
. 
 
2.3.3 Critique of Moellendorf’s approach  
      This theory of justice approach might be criticized as relying excessively on a justificatory 
process that is tied too closely to the liberal democratic tradition, where identities as citizens have 
been shaped by the liberal democratic tradition, since the interests in exercising these moral powers 
exist only for persons in those societies
76
. But as a defence towards this claim, Moellendorf argues 
that the legal and economic changes associated with globalization are producing some tendencies 
towards normative convergence. It may be possible to find common normative bases even when on 
the surface these appear doubtful. But, as he states, he has no illusions that a justified principle of 
equality of opportunity will be the basis of a non-controversial policy. Equality is a controversial 
moral ideal, particularly in the presence of traditional non-egalitarian norms
77
. 
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      Moellendorf argues that if the moral requirement of equal respect for all persons dictates 
egalitarian distributive principles domestically, then it must have similar implications globally. But 
several prominent contemporary politically philosophers have presented challenges to this idea. 
They argue that egalitarian justice is conditioned by the existence of legal coercion, and that these 
conditions do not obtain non-compatriots
78
. He, on the other hand, takes social justice to be a 
property of social and political institutions, maintaining that it is not limited to legal coercion
79
, 
arguing that we have general moral duties to all persons; but according to the principle of 
associational justice, we may have special duties of justice to certain persons with whom we share 
an association even if we are non-voluntary members of the same association
80
 
81
. 
      Like Moellendorf, Thomas Pogge is a well-known contributor to the field of institutional global 
justice. Pogge’s account is institutional in taking justice to be a property of social relations; 
however, Pogge’s account seeks to limit the claims of justice even further by subsuming them all 
under negative duties
82
.  
      Peter Singer’s account of global justice is similar to Moellendorf’s in that it is not taking duties 
of justice to be limited only to non-maleficence. But Singer endorses an interactional, rather than 
institutional, account, which takes global justice to be based upon the impartial duty of individuals 
to assist all others, who can be helped
83
. In scope it is not limited by institutional conditions; and in 
content not limited to those whom we harm.  
      Due to the strong EU focus on institutionalization of relations with third parties, I believe that 
Moellendorf’s approach is a suitable theory for investigating the level of justice in the institutional 
frame for EU-Africa development. 
      Even though the EU focuses on the equality of the parties involved in their relations, through 
strong emphasize on ownership and bilateralism, power is a very common point of study, when it 
comes to the EU relations to the developing world.  
  The concept of power is central to international relations, yet disciplinary discussions tend to 
privilege only one, albeit important, form: an actor controlling another to do what that other would 
not otherwise do
84
. Barnett and Duvall argue that the disciplinary tendency to associate power with 
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realism, and to work primarily with the realist conceptualization, partly owes to the fact that rivals 
to realism typically distance themselves from "power" considerations
85
.  
            This is an interesting aspect to hold parallel to the discussion on ethics in relations to 
institutional cosmopolitanism, since it may point to aspects of the outcome of EU foreign policies in 
general, and the Food Security Thematic Programme in particular, that has not yet been taken into 
consideration. 
. 
2.4 Power in relation to ethics and institutional cosmopolitanism  
       Barnett and Duvall works with what they name ‘taxonomy of power’, arguing that power is the 
production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine 
their circumstances and fate. They argue that by showing conceptual favouritism, the discipline of 
international relations not only overlooks the different forms of power in international politics, but 
also fails to develop sophisticated understandings of how global outcomes are produced and how 
actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates
86
.  
2.4.1 Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power 
      They argue that their conception is preferable for two reasons; it better reflects conventional 
understandings insofar as most scholars interested in power are concerned not simply with how 
effects are produced, but rather with how these effects work to the advantage of some and the 
disadvantage of others. Secondly, a focus on differential effects on actor capacities is closer to the 
mark in most social relations. Their argument is that there are indeed moments of completely 
voluntary persuasion and collective choice, but that these are rare and likely to have uneven effects. 
This is why conceptual distinctions of power should be represented in terms of two analytical 
dimensions that are at the core of the general concept: the kinds of social relations through which 
power works and the specificity of social relations through which effects on actors' capacities are 
produced
87
.  
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      The four types of power are:   
 Compulsory Power: Direct Control Over Another88. Compulsory power is present whenever 
A's actions control B's actions or circumstances, even if unintentionally. Because power is 
the production of effects, compulsory power is best understood from the perspective of the 
recipient, not the deliverer, of the direct action. Compulsory power is not limited to material 
resources
89
. 
 Institutional Power: Actors' Control Over Socially Distant Others. The conceptual focus 
here is on the formal and informal institutions that  mediate between A and B, as A, working 
through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains 
the actions and conditions of others. In other words, A does not "possess" the resources of 
power, but because A stands in a particular relation to the relevant institutional 
arrangements, its actions exercise power over
 90
 
 Structural Power: Direct and Mutual Constitution of the Capacities of Actors.  Whereas 
institutional power focuses on constraints on action, structural power concerns the 
determination of social capacities and interests. A, exists only by virtue of its relation to 
structural position, B. The social structure not only constitutes actors and their capacities, it 
also shapes their self-understanding and subjective interests. In other words, structural 
power can work to constrain some actors from recognizing their own domination
91
. 
 Productive Power: Production of Subjects through Diffuse Social Relations Structural and 
productive power differs in a critical respect: whereas the former works through direct 
structural relations, the latter entails more generalized and diffuse social processes. It 
concerns discourse, social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning 
is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed
92
. To attend to the analysis of 
productive power is to focus on how diffuse and contingent social processes produce 
particular kinds of subjects, fix meanings and categories, and create what is taken for 
granted and the ordinary of world politics.
93
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  Barnett and Duvall stress that there is no ontological or epistemological reason why scholars 
working with one of those concepts need to exclude the effects identified by the other
 94
. 
Taxonomies not only highlight distinct types but also point to connections between them. The 
framework, therefore, suggests how scholars might consider how productive power makes some 
instances of compulsory power possible and legitimate, and, in turn, how compulsory power shapes 
the terms of meaning that influence how actors see what is possible and desirable
95
. 
      These types of power constitute common, but very different, types of power that I will examine 
whether or not are present in the case of the Food Thematic Programme, and what this may result 
in. 
  
2.5 Method                
  According to Moellendorf, the method for claiming an injustice requires 
 Identifying inequalities; 
 Whether these are between members of some association of the requisite kind; 
 Considering whether they are excusable in light of one of the four exceptions (or some 
other one)
96
. 
      To be able to establish an injustice, it is important to acknowledge that the test of an explanatory 
value demands accepting that ‘evidence’ is constructed and theory-dependent, and therefore needs 
to be questioned
97
. 
      Kant did not only deal with ethics, but also with methodology. He argued that one can never say 
anything about how the ‘Real World’ is, but only the way one perceives it98. And the perception of 
justice is what is dealt with in this thesis, through the theory-frame presented. In that sense it is not 
based on a clear ontology, and will need a thorough analysis not to be biased towards one or another 
idea. 
      I would argue that since it is not the country-specific outcome I am studying, but the overall 
perception of institutional justice, a single case-study is the most suitable method. If I was to study 
the outcome of a specific project within the programme, then another method would be appropriate. 
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      The design and implementation of theory-oriented case studies consists of three phases, 
according to George and Bennett; in phase one the objectives, design and structures are formulated. 
This is what this full methodological chapter is establishing. In phase two, the case study is carried 
out in accordance with the design, and finally one draws upon the findings of the case study and 
assesses the contribution to achieve the research objective of the study
99
. 
      The method will be congruence method, characterised by that one begins with a theory and then 
attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case. The theory posits 
a relation between variance in the independent variable and variance in the dependent variable; it 
can be deductive or take the form of an empirical generalization. The analyst first ascertains the 
value of the independent variable, in this case institutional frame of the EU food-security policy, 
and then asks what prediction or expectation about the outcome of the dependent variable, in this 
case justice,  should follow from the theory
100
.  
      A critique against single-case studies has often been that they are at great risk of being vague in 
the face of more than one possible explanation, and that they can lead to questionable statements, if 
one blindly trusts a possible consistency between a theory’s predictions and the case outcome101. 
But the advantages of this method is that I will not have to trace the causal process that leads from 
the independent variable to the case outcome; so the method does not require a great deal of data 
about the case being studied
102
.  
George and Bennett describe how the congruence method has often been used when it comes to 
decision-making in the study of foreign policy
103
. 
      The aim is to formulate what George and Bennett names ‘well-specified conditional 
generalizations of more limited scope’, since these tend to be more useful in policy-making, than 
grander generalizations
104
. But as the dilemma of trade and food-security is not unique for Sub-
Saharan Africa, even though some features of it are, it may be possible to say something general 
about the level of institutional justice in the Thematic Food Security Programme.       
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2.5.1 The data 
       To be able to establish whether or not institutional justice is present, one needs to know the 
position of both the associates, therefore the main data will be the Communications from the 
Commission, with a focus on the documents of the Thematic Strategy for Food Security, which will 
be treated as my main cases. The first was issued in 2006, the second, and latest, in 2010. They will 
be supplemented with related document. These will be held against the documents on food-security 
formulated by the African Union, to detect differences in priorities, and by that be able to answer 
the research-question of whether the institutional frame set up by the EU, can be labelled just.  
            The theoretical frames of institutional justice and the different types of powers presented by 
Barnett and Duvall, will be the frame for the analysis, supplemented by an empirical analysis of 
results other researchers have presented on related topics.  
The Communications are the ones handling the Thematic Strategy for Food Security, where there 
have been two, so far. Here the focus will be primarily on the last one, covering the years 2011-
2013
105
. These, together with the Communication 'An EU policy framework to assist developing 
countries in addressing food security challenges' are the main documents on the Union’s approach 
to reaching the MDG’s106, and sets out the conditions and goals on how this issue is to be 
approached, by projects for long-term development in the area of food security. 
      To be able to argue anything about the institutional justice of this, we need to know how the 
receiving part thinks of this. The one coming closest to this is the African Unions own documents 
on food security
107
. By analysing these two unions’108 approaches to food security it should be 
possible to state something about the justice of it, based on whether or not they focus on the same 
issues, and how the ones where they might disagree, are handled. This is also where the power-
analysis comes into play; how the outcome of these points-of-justice is handled. 
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     Since the AU’s food security programme is not a reply to the EU’s, I will use secondary sources 
to find discussions on the issues where there might be different approaches. These will primarily be 
by the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and other institutions dealing with food 
security-related issues. These will be supplemented with, primarily peer-reviewed, secondary-
sources to be able to establish a meta-analysis on the justice and power-relations of the case. 
 
2.5.2 Delimitations 
      Darrel Moellendorf employs an understanding of justifications, stating that a justification must 
employ premises; it must make assumptions
109. For example regarding ‘human dignity’, he 
presumes its existence, since what we make of human dignity is the object of interest, rather than 
the existence of human dignity. I accept the premise of human dignity on the same accounts, just as 
I will not go into a discussion on whether or not contested concepts such as ‘human rights’ are 
universal norms or not, and what they should be defined as. I will rather focus on the use of these 
concepts in power-relations. 
      Development is a field with cross-cutting issues, and it can be argued to be impossible to 
analyse the outcome of these, when focusing on one component alone. This is why I am not trying 
to answer whether or not the food-security agenda, or the MDGs works or can be achieved, but 
focus on the premise of institutional justice in it. 
      There are several other documents on food-security that could be interesting to look at, both 
within the EU as well as in the global institutional setting of the United Nations (UN), the WTO etc. 
But due to the limited scope of this thesis, these will mainly be used as complementary sources.  
  
Empirical data 
      In the following chapters I will analyse elements of what is presented as the most important 
focus-points, by the two Unions’, when it comes to securing long-term food security. Since they do 
not exist independently of the global society, I shall start with a short introduction on the global 
approach to these issues. 
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3. The world food security situation 
      The food security situation, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, has changed for the worse the 
past decade, and therefore obstructs reducing poverty and hunger by half by 2015
110
. While Asia 
has the largest numbers of undernourished in the world, halving the proportion of people who suffer 
from hunger remains the biggest challenge in Africa, where the highest hunger rates are found
111
. 
       During the increases in food prices in 2007-2008, the poorest people were hit hardest by this 
crisis, since a larger share of their income is spent on food
112
.  
Food prices remain high in many developing countries. Concurrently, it led to lower wages and 
higher unemployment, due to reduced income from abroad following reduced investment and 
exports
113
, and the global food crisis threw the relationship between food security and international 
trade into sharp relief. The global food crisis and the likelihood of higher food prices in the future 
are most evident in international trade in agriculture and food. In the post-crisis context, there has 
been a renewed interest in using international trade rules to support a more enabling environment 
for food security
114
.  
 
      What we can read from this is that there clearly is an association of the kind Moellendorf writes.      
The economic crises that lead to a food-crisis clearly resulted in activity affecting those not directly 
involved. This is neither voluntary nor intentional, by any of the associates. It could be argued that 
the debate on using international trade rules to prevent similar outcomes again, could be a way of 
securing institutional justice. If the institutions prevent harm, based on common interests, they are 
just.  
      An interagency report
115
 published in 2011, states that “trade is an essential component of any 
food security strategy”116, regarding price volatility, which refers to variations in economic 
variables over time, in this case with variations in agricultural prices over time
117
. 
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      The recognition of trade as an essential component of food security is a clear signal that the link 
between food security and the global economic association is recognised. The growing acceptance 
of trade as a crucial element of food security is a recognition of the compatriot-status of people in 
different parts of the world, due to the associational bounds, and the economic and political 
consequences of current trade-rules. Advocating for the establishment of just principles is a great 
leap towards securing institutional justice. 
      This is, somewhat similarly, argued by Jenny Clover, stating that food insecurity is no longer 
seen simply as a failure of agriculture to produce sufficient food at the national level, but instead as 
a failure to guarantee access to sufficient food at the household level
118
. This indicates a wider 
recognition of food security being an associational challenge, where every participant in the global 
economy, through its institutions, are compatriots and therefore have obligations of justice towards 
each other.  This new approach to food security is evident on UN-level as well, as we will see in the 
next chapter. 
3.1 The UN-agenda and food security 
       The UN Secretary-General established a High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security 
Crisis (UNHLTF) in 2008. During the 2009 World Summit on Food Security in Rome it was 
decided to concentrate all efforts through the evolving Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food 
Security and Nutrition. The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) is a central component in 
global governance on food security. The five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security 
are: i) investment in country-owned plans; ii) strategic coordination to improve governance; iii) a 
twin-track approach to tackle hunger as well as the root causes of hunger and poverty; iv) a stronger 
role for the multilateral system; and v) increased investment in agriculture, food security and 
nutrition
119
. 
     
  There is, in other words, a firm belief in the connection between agriculture and food security, in 
other ways than just securing growing production, on a global level. Tackling hunger cannot be 
solved by simply producing more food— famines have occurred even with plenty of food120. And 
according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), there is 
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growing recognition of the importance of understanding the political, economic and social 
processes that promote or block change, and to understand the role of institutions, power and the 
underlying context in developing countries. This has been reinforced by the ongoing reform of aid-
deliverance. This includes not only increased country ownership and the move from projects to 
sector and budget support, but also expectations that analytical work might secure harmonisation 
and joint donor initiatives
121
.  
      The global focus on this indicates that it is seen as an associational problem, and not something 
isolated. The enhancement of the multilateral system indicates this as well, and at the same time it is 
an indicator in the same direction as point (i); that food security should be secured in partnership, 
based on the premises of country-ownership, instead of something that is to be handed them. From 
an institutional justice-Point of view, this is important since it indicates equality instead of a more 
classic binary donor-recipient of aid.  
      The Rome Principles where established by a large group of countries, and can perhaps be 
argued to set the standards for what is now the ‘truth’ about food security in world politics, thereby 
being a source of productive power, whereas previously rather few countries, through its aid-
policies, set the standards and therefore had power over, rather than power to. 
      According to the World Bank, regional and shared decision making is required to secure 
coherent and sustainable positions. They argue that justice is needed if a comprehensive security is 
to be achieved, recognising that human security matters at least as much as the more traditional 
defence role of protecting national security. Global, national and human security issues are not 
merely converging; they are overlapping
122
, and from that perspective the productive power of the 
Rome Principles are in line with the concept of institutional justice.   
 
3.2 The WTO-frame 
      The WTO sets the basic parameters of trade rules, ranging from border measures to domestic 
food assistance programs. Therefore it is important to look at this framework to be able to state 
anything of the institutional justice in the EU Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) towards 
Africa. Since the Union is liable to the WTO when it comes to trade-issues, which in turn where 
mentioned by the AU as one of the main reasons for its food security situation. 
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     The current trade regime for agriculture was established during the Uruguay round of 
negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, at a time when overproduction and 
declining prices dominated the agenda.  
      This is in sharp contrast to today, where food, energy, finance, changing global supply and 
demand dynamics, and greater consolidation in the agri-food sector, are seen as intertwined when it 
comes to food-security. As a result, the existing WTO agricultural trade architecture is primarily 
concerned with managing States’ policy response to declining agricultural prices123. 
 
      In other words the institutional setting for trade has yet to take the leap towards securing 
institutional justice. The WTO-negotiations leading to the present rules, where established during a 
time where the developed countries had even bigger institutional power, than they do today. Today, 
where these rules are being negotiated on again, there are more players on the field. And according 
to the principles of institutional justice, the dominating countries have a duty to observe the 
established institutional principles that ensure that the “rest” is being treated justly, or to advocate 
for the establishment of just principles. During the Doha Round food security has been high on the 
agenda
124
, but the negotiations are ongoing.  
      Now, there is a distinction between moral and legal approaches to justice, both practical and 
philosophical. Moellendorf applies the distinction where the moral abstracts from existing 
institutional requirements and develops an account of the duties that persons owe to each other by 
considering the nature of justice itself; whereas the legal seeks a grasp of existing practices and 
institutions, to establish the rules that govern obligation
125
. This explains why the act of strictly 
obeying the established rules, are not necessarily enough to secure justice. A legal frame is not 
necessarily just in itself. And even though the WTO is rule-based, the mere fact that the rules are 
under negotiation, indicates that the members of the organisations recognise this difference between 
moral and legal justice.  
      Food security is explicitly stated in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), and is referenced in 
other parts of the WTO framework. Food Security is here stated to be a non-trade concern
126
. In 
other words, the current rules do not fully recognise food security, in its present terminology, as an 
associational challenge.  
                                                          
123
 LIVIER DE SCHUTTER, activity report November 2011, p. 3 
124
 LIVIER DE SCHUTTER, activity report November 2011, p. 4 
125
 Moellendorf, (2002), p. 2 
126
 LIVIER DE SCHUTTER, activity report November 2011, p. 4 
  
32 
      But at the same time there has been a shift in the way many countries approach trade and food 
security; marked by an increased reliance on international trade to meet domestic needs. This led 
many developing countries to restructure their domestic agricultural sectors to specialized 
commodity production for exports
127
, leading to a shift towards non-food agricultural production, 
particularly in the least developed countries (LDCs), who went from being net agricultural exporters 
to importers
128
. 
           The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food states that net food exporters, for whom 
food security is a low internal priority, dominate negotiations in the WTO, and therefore food 
security has a tendency to be treated as a “bargaining chip”. If the Doha Round continues on its 
present track, future agricultural trade rules are unlikely to be well suited to support global policy 
efforts to address food
129
. Confirming the relatively higher grade of influence on negotiations by 
developed countries, this is a clear ethical dilemma. Not only is a duty treated as a bargaining chip, 
which is clearly not in line with the ethical premises for it, but using it as a bargaining chip is also a 
way of securing compulsory power.  
      Whereas more general moral duties may have no problem with this, it is a clear neglect of the 
institutional duty of justice incorporated as a dialectic truth in the global institutional settings. Since 
trade, in all of the above mentioned institutions, apart from the WTO, is seen as associational issue, 
there are also claims of duty; trade is widely acknowledge to hinder food-security for the poorest, 
whom we are compatriots with due to the global economic association, and therefore the WTO has 
an obligation to secure that trade does not hinder justice.  
       
3.2.1 The WTO Agreements 
      The Uruguay Round produced the first multilateral agreement dedicated to the agricultural trade 
sector. It is still being implemented by developing countries; since they do not have to cut subsidies 
or lower tariffs as much as developed countries, and are given extra time to complete their 
obligations. Least-developed countries don’t have to do this at all130.         
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      Domestic support—support provided through subsidies paid by government to producers or 
through administered prices—is classified as falling into three “boxes”, depending on their potential 
degree of trade-distortion
131
. 
 
      From a perspective of institutional justice, the fact that developing-countries do not have to 
adopt the same strict rules as the rest is in favour of arguing justice in the WTO-system. 
Moellendorf argues for four plausible exceptions that could support a difference between the pro 
tanto endorsement of a principle of equality and a complete justification of a principle in particular 
cases, as seen in section 2.3.2, this positive discrimination of developing countries, could be argued 
to be in line with nr 4; Offering incentives that produce differential outcomes could benefit 
everyone in comparison to their condition under equality. But one must also remember that the 
prima facie principle of equality would then still be non-present, since the four plausible exceptions 
should be based on choice, not structural injustices. But, at any rate, this positive discrimination is 
better aligned with justice, than the WTO would be without it.  
      According to the UN Special Rapporteur, it was generally feared that trade liberalization during 
the Uruguay round would have negative global welfare effects, as subsidy reforms would result in 
higher prices. This was the basis for the 1994 Marrakesh Decision
132
, securing the exceptions for 
developing countries
133
. 
      According to the World Bank, a Doha Round agreement would stimulate trade and raise 
incomes, leading to a substantial reduction in global poverty
134
. However, they also suggest that 
over half of the gains to developing countries from global agricultural reforms would come from 
liberalization by developing countries themselves. Because agricultural tariffs are higher in 
developing countries and because a growing share of developing country-trade is now with other 
developing countries. Developing countries—among them the G-20—are emphasizing the need for 
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cuts to agricultural subsidies in the developed world, partly because they think that is the main 
sources of distortion, but also because they do not want to lower their own food import 
restrictions
135
. 
    What is visible here is a clear shift in power-relations. The growing inclusion of “the rest”, as 
opposed to the previous compulsory power by “the west”, in trade-negotiations, perhaps somewhat 
weakens the institutional power of ‘the west’, explaining why the Doha-round has proven hard to 
complete. Institutional power held by the developed world is still rather clear in the WTO, but the 
developing world is at the same time gaining structural power in this field. By being the opposite of 
developed, there are somewhat other rules to obey, and there may occur tensions when these 
structural issues are negotiated. When the WTO-rules do not fully recognise food security as an 
associational challenge, structural power can work to constrain some actors from recognizing their 
own domination. 
      Now we move on to the more specific area of interest, that is the EU’s approach to food security 
in terms of long-term socio-economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
    
 3.3 The EU Food Security Policy 
        The food security policy has evolved from the simple delivery of food aid to support for broad-
based food security strategies. Food Security remains a priority in “The European Consensus for 
Development” adopted by the Commission in July 2005 and endorsed by the Council in November 
2005. 
      In the transition from emergency (humanitarian phase) to development, the idea on EU aid is 
within a broad economic, social and political context
136
.  
      The EU is a leading international donor in Food Security (€4.9 billion was allocated between 
1996 and 2006, i.e. an annual average of €500 million). The Union is also actively engaged in the 
international policy debate, for example on trade and food aid and is a leading donor in agricultural 
research both at global, regional and national levels. 
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       As described in the introduction, the European Commission proposed the Thematic Programme 
on Food Security in an effort to rationalise and simplify the existing legislative framework 
governing external actions of the Community, separated from all food aid of a humanitarian 
nature
137
. 
        The aim was to establish a long-term structural approach to tackling the root causes of food 
insecurity
138
. 
So far, the EU has established strong working relations with the United Nations High Level Task 
Force (UNHLTF), as well as with individual UN organisations. The Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is the main partner in the field of agricultural 
research. The CGIAR includes the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), which 
undertakes research on food policy issues
139
. 
      All of this goes well in line with the global consensus on long-term socio-economic 
development, based on agriculture, as the main road towards stable food security. From an ethical 
perspective, this is a positive development, since it coheres with the principles of institutional 
justice, as it focuses more on cooperation than philanthropy.  
      
4. The Food Security Thematic Programme 
      Now we move on to the specific programme under scrutiny. In the following chapters the main-
points of the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) will be presented and analysed, from the 
perspectives of institutional justice and the four types of power, presented in chapter 2.1. and 2.2. 
 
4.1 Lessons learnt from the past 
      In 2009, a Mid-Term Review (MTR) gave a positive assessment of the first phase of the FSTP. 
The review highlighted the relevance of FSTP interventions and recommended continuation. It also 
made specific recommendations on ways to improve the strategy, by re-balancing the attention 
given to the different areas on food security, to focus more on social protection and improved food 
access and nutritional adequacy. Moreover, the review recommended that the new strategic 
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priorities should be programmed with a stronger internal cohesion and should reflect the current 
international debate on global, regional and national food security more closely, while adding value 
to geographical programmes
140
. 
 
The Union conducts evaluations on the results and impacts of activities financed by EC funds, 
aimed at both informing the public and for drawing lessons on what has worked and what has not. 
This is done on the basis that evaluation checks outcome-conformity with set objectives
141
. This 
MTR is not public in itself, but referred to in the FSTP, but in general it can be said that the 
recommendations are in line with the premises for securing institutional justice; if person A owes a 
duty of justice to person B, then A has a duty to observe the established institutional principles that 
ensure B is being treated justly. This is, no matter what, easier to secure if entering a dialogue on 
the issue. 
 
4.2 The policy agenda 
      The European Consensus on Development focuses on the attainment of the MDGs and 
addresses food insecurity as a priority in the fight against poverty.  
In order to maximise the effectiveness of investments, the food security policy framework also 
makes it clear that work is required on three sets of conditions: i) national and regional agriculture 
and food security strategies and policies; (ii) harmonising EU interventions (including Policy 
Coherence for Development); and (iii) improving the coherence of the international governance 
system. Moreover, the policy framework provides a certain focus, by prioritising four related areas: 
(i) improving resilience of small-scale farmers and rural livelihoods; (ii) effective governance of 
agriculture and food security; (iii) regional policies on agriculture and food security; and (iv) 
strengthening assistance mechanisms for vulnerable population groups. 
 
      It is clear that the FSTP emphasises coherence with the broad international societal approach to 
food security, and seeks to influence this even more through this programme. Since the global 
community indeed is global, through the broad participatory degree within the different institutions 
working on food security, it could be argued that there is a degree of institutional justice. But at the 
same time it is important to remember the complex issue of non-voluntariness; this global 
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consensus might also be a result of the normative convergence discussed in section 2.3.3. 
Moellendorf defends his close connection to the liberal democratic tradition based on this norm-
cascade in the international society, but at the same time one could argue that this is a result of the 
institutional as well as productive powers present in the global society. 
      Regarding the issue of coherence, the most common definition of this is, “referring to the 
necessity of bringing together different strands of political action both strategically and 
procedurally”142; it is important to remember that coherence, according to Carmen Gebhard, is an 
unattainable state, but this does not mean that it is not a sound guiding principle
143
. But is 
incoherence compatible with institutional justice? This will be elaborated on, in later chapters.  
       As seen in chapter 2.3.1, constructing institutions in line with human rights involve seeing 
persons as sources of practical reasons
144
 -as having the status to make demands on institutions. An 
institution directed by a principle that persons cannot reasonably approve on, is an institution that is 
not respecting persons as sources of practical reasons. There is, also, another sort of respect for 
human dignity, which Moellendorf calls justificatory respect. Justificatory respect requires a 
justification of institutional principles that can be reasonably accepted by those who live under 
them
145
. 
      The association created by the processes of economic globalization is, according to 
Moellendorf, a structural feature of capitalist economic development,  governed primarily by the 
norm of competition, and by norms of governance that have evolved to preserve the capitalist order. 
Today this functions, partly through the regulatory framework established by the WTO
146
. Taking 
this into consideration, one has to consider non-voluntariness as a possibility, in the same manner as 
regarding the liberal agenda, discussed earlier in this chapter. 
      Although state leaders are formally free to form their engagement in the global market, 
Moellendorf argues that the fact that nearly every country of the world is a member of the WTO is 
evidence that there is no reasonable alternative. Moreover, in many cases, democratic institutions 
are compromised or non-existent; so, citizens of countries that choose this development path have 
no choice in the matter
147
. 
                                                          
142
 Carmen Gebhard, Coherence, chapter 5 in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, International Relations and the 
European Union, (2011), (Oxford University Press, Oxford), p. 103 
143
 Gebhard, in Hill & Smith, (2011), p. 124 
144
Moellendorf, (2009), p. 10 
145
Moellendorf, (2009), p. 11 
146
 Moellendorf, (2009), p. 49 
147
 Moellendorf, (2009), p. 51 
  
38 
      According to FreedomHouse’s report ‘Freedom in the World 2013’ Sub-Saharan Africa has, in 
recent years, been ranked as the world's most politically volatile region, with major democratic 
breakthroughs in some countries, and crackdowns in others. While the region saw several 
significant gains, especially in West Africa, civil conflicts and the emergence of violent Islamist 
groups prevented an overall upgrade for political freedom
148
. 
      Moellendorf argues that the democratic political ideal can be employed as an interpretive guide 
for the rules that govern political institutions. We should reject rules that provide favoured 
membership status on the basis of considerations such as family background or natural talents. A 
political association with institutions of equal and inclusive citizenship would ensure both the equal 
treatment of persons and the social bases for equal influence in the political process
149
. By this he is 
not referring to the positive discrimination on behalf of the developing countries, since these as 
argued can be fit under the exceptions under which the prima facie of equality can be justifiable set 
aside, but rather to the inherent institutional power the developed world can be argued to have in the 
liberal, capitalist world order in general, and the WTO in particular.  
      From this perspective the EU is a holder of institutional power, in the sense of the concept as 
defined by George and Bennett. One might even argue that, at least up until the Doha round where 
developing countries has gained influence, the WTO as such was a structure based on compulsory 
power, when it came to trade. If there is no alternative, one has the power over.  
      Apart from this, one can also see clear signs of the EU striving for productive power; through 
acting as an agenda-setter and emphasising the goal of coherence in the global food security system, 
the EU uses what George and Bennett describes as diffuse and contingent social processes, to 
establish rules-of-the-game. 
 
4.3 Objective 
      The objective of the FSTP is to improve food security for the poorest and most vulnerable and 
to help achieve the first MDG (eradicating poverty and hunger), by means of a set of actions which 
ensure overall coherence and continuity of EU assistance
150
. Continuity of assistance is ensured 
through the transition from relief to development
151
. 
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4.4 Strategic priorities 
      Taking into account the recommendations of the MTR to better streamline FSTP assistance 
dimensions, the 2011-2013 Strategy was set to operate on three strategic priority areas. The 
strategic priorities where: (1) research, technology transfer and innovation to enhance food security; 
(2) strengthened governance approaches for food security; and (3) addressing food security for the 
poor and vulnerable in fragile situations
152
. The last one of these will not be dealt with in this thesis, 
since it is closely related to humanitarian aid, with its focus on fragile situations, and not so much 
with the long-term perspective on development, which is the main focus of this thesis.  
 
4.4.1 Strategic priority 1 
      One of the priorities in the FSTP is based on that the EU recognises the importance of investing 
in international public goods, in particular in pro-poor, demand-driven research and technological 
innovation as well as capacity development and South-South and South-North scientific and 
technical cooperation, as a way to address food security challenges in developing countries. 
      Strong linkages will also be built between programmes at the global, continental and regional 
level
153
. 
      More attention will be devoted to capacity building of southern organisations and to cross-
cutting issues, such as environmental sustainability, social equity and gender and to the threats and 
opportunities presented by climate change
154
. 
  
     
4.4.2 Strategic priority 2 
      This priority focuses on innovative approaches to building ‘bottom-up’ networks based on 
national experience of linking food security policy, research, capacity strengthening, technology 
transfer, and rural development, as well as promoting South-South collaboration and stimulates 
linkages with other strategic priorities of FSTP
155
. 
                                                          
152
 FOOD SECURITY THEMATIC PROGRAMME THEMATIC STRATEGY PAPER,  2011-2013, p. 15 
153
 FOOD SECURITY THEMATIC PROGRAMME THEMATIC STRATEGY PAPER,  2011-2013, p. 15 
154
FOOD SECURITY THEMATIC PROGRAMME THEMATIC STRATEGY PAPER, 2011-2013, p.  20 
155
 FOOD SECURITY THEMATIC PROGRAMME THEMATIC STRATEGY PAPER,  2011-2013, p 16 
  
40 
      In order to improve food security governance further, priority is in particular on policy 
formulation and implementation, institutional capacity building, information provision and 
management, and enhanced effectiveness. 
      At the global level, this strategic priority supports recent food and nutrition security governance 
developments. At the continental and regional levels, this strategic priority supports the 
development and implementation of food security policies and strategies and the work of the key 
organisations and platforms involved
156
. 
Another theme is 'participation for governance', under which key stakeholders in food security 
governance, such as farmers' organisations, private sector organisations and other civil society 
groups, was set to play a more pro-active part in food security dialogue, policy formulation and 
implementation, and lesson learning
157
. This includes a strengthening of institutional capacities (at 
national and regional levels; among governments and in civil society), as well as the development 
of laws and policies. 
      Standards, policies and institutions related to food safety and animal and plant health are central 
to food trade, producers' incomes and consumer health
 158
. The FSTP supports food safety 
interventions that increase complementarity and avoid duplications, and focus sharply on pro-poor 
issues. At the continental and regional level, where the EU has a comparative advantage due to its 
size and regional integration experience which it can share with its partners, the FSTP will support 
agricultural, food security and nutrition approaches. 
      The interventions should result in enhanced capacities of African institutions to 
comprehensively analyse and plan a strategy for food security issues, and forms these views into 
operational plans. In addition, there will be support for efforts in Africa to improve the agricultural 
value chain and incentives for quality products within regional economic communities.
 159
 
Similarly, other networks, such as civil society organisations (NGOs, regional and local authorities), 
should be supported in their information sharing, advocacy, coordination and networking functions 
related to food security governance
160
 
 
By the strong focus on empowering, through the discourse of capacity-building, the Union 
implicitly labels itself an actor that has capacity, as opposed to the ‘other’, and through the agenda 
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of strengthening South-South corporation, the Union, while perhaps empowering, at the same time 
also acts as a conserver by reproducing the fixed self-understandings and binary relations. The 
practice of ‘othering’ has received much attention as an activity by which EU constructs its identity 
as a normative power. ‘Othering’ refers to the demarcation of the self against something else, not 
necessarily related to what the ‘other’ is. According to Sibylle Scheipers & Daniela Sicurelli, 
othering is also a transformative action with very ‘real’ consequences, due to the fact that continued 
depiction of an ‘other’, in terms of securitization, detects the ‘other’ as a threat to one self, directly 
or indirectly. Apart from that, they also argue that ‘othering’ has a strong connotation of 
disempowering the other while at the same time empowering the self
161
. This is related to what 
George and Bennett describes as power to, associated with structural power as well as productive 
power.  
      An important focus is that of affecting policy-formation. By doing this at the same time as 
labelling the Union as the one who has the capabilities, the Union can be argued to act in terms of 
consolidating its structural power, by actively shaping the roles of both themselves and the object of 
the FSTP. 
 
4.5 Summary of the institutional justice and power embedded in the FSTP 
    What we have seen in this chapter is how the EU’s approach to food security looks through its 
Food Security Thematic Programme. It is rather clear that the EU focus on issues in this area is 
aligned with the global consensus on what issues are crucial to obtain long-term development and 
food security.   
      As was also stated in the introduction, the EU plays a major role with regard to developing 
countries exports
162
. In a report named An EU policy framework to assist developing countries in 
addressing food security Challenges the Commission states that reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy has enhanced coherence, and future reforms will continue to take global food 
security objectives into account. Finally, a balanced, comprehensive and ambitious conclusion of 
the Doha Development Agenda would strengthen the international trading system, with beneficial 
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effects on food security
163
. So, even though the CAP and its relations to agricultural trade are not 
mentioned in the Food Security Thematic Programme, it is commented on, in relation to this 
subject. But it is not recognised as a main issue, related to food security. But, as seen in the 
introduction of this thesis, trade is often argued to be one of the EU-policies obstructing a coherent 
development-policy.  
     Manners writes that coherence entails ensuring that the EU is not simply promoting its own 
norms, but that the normative principles that constitute the EU and its external actions are part of a 
more universalizable and holistic strategy for world peace. This is part of the reason for the EU’s 
references to the UN’s Charters as well as other institutional setting164.  
      From a more general ethics-perspective, one can argue that the idea of universalism which the 
EU favours is less compatible with virtue ethics than with the more universal approaches, even 
though the Union also has virtue ethics traits. According to Manners this is significant for debates 
regarding the EU’s interactions with the rest of the world, for example when it comes to issues such 
as aid and trade
165. When applying utilitarian ethics, the goal for the EU should be to ‘do least 
harm’ in world politics; empowering the ‘other’, in contrast to, what Manners describes as, ‘the 
self-empowering actions of much foreign, development and humanitarian policy’166.  
      As Mayer points out, within the EU there is an emphasis on duties and rules as opposed to 
clearly defined virtues or moral characters. However, when it comes to implementation by the EU 
there is also an element of ‘living by example’ (virtue ethics) and, of course, the interplay between 
actors, outcomes and consequences (utilitarian ethics)
167
.  
      Universalism is assumed in all areas of global governance; for instance, international law relies 
on some common understanding of justice
168
. 
      The institutional justice approach has traits of both kinds; it focuses on the outcome, but instead 
of a sole focus on outcome –development, it also demands that the independent variable of justice 
in the process is present. In that sense this theoretical approach is more complex, covering the grey-
zones of the otherwise rather, theoretically abstract, black and white approaches of ethics-theory.  
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      Moellendorf argues that if global institutions cannot, for example, maximize all of the economic 
advantages of the least advantaged, then a principle of justice is best taken as an ideal of global 
justice, but not an expression of a duty. It seems rather that the content of distributive duties in a 
partially globalized world is best characterized as indeterminately egalitarian. Once the capacity of 
global institutions increases sufficiently then the content of the egalitarian duties take on that of the 
ideal. Meanwhile, inequalities in global institutions are suspect; they require justification on 
grounds that those who are disadvantaged could reasonably endorse
169
. This has been discussed in 
the chapters on the international food security situation, in terms of for example the WTO-rules. In 
other words institutional justice on a global level is an ideal, but should be so without being a 
manifesto-goal as opposed to a goal actively sought. Using ones institutional power to change the 
CAP into something that is acceptable under the WTO, is not necessarily the same thing as 
changing it into something that is more just, unless it is perceived as such by the other part. 
      Moellendorf’s institutional account of justice holds that legislative intent of unequal protection, 
powers and outcomes need not exist in order for inequality to require justification; rather the ability 
to exercise social control over such inequality is relevant. Because even where legislation exists 
human control is possible, and where legal sanctions exist there may be no reasonable alternative to 
compliance
170
. 
 
      The EU’s normative power is often understood as a practice by which the EU seeks to spread its 
core norms, such as human rights, democracy, rule of law and environmental protection, 
internationally. According to Manners, the distinctive feature of the concept of normative power is 
that it refers to a specific form of power: ‘“power over opinion”. Normative power is thus defined 
as the ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’171, thus related to the 
concept of structural and productive power. 
      Scheipers and Sicurelli
 
writes that the EU is building its identity through providing Sub-Saharan 
countries with legitimacy as partners and recognition of their own identity, and that this is an 
expression of the same attempt of the EU to appear as the force for good
172
. They argue that the 
practice of empowering is not restricted to discourses of identity construction. Rather, it involves a 
variety of practices and power resources, such as transfer of knowledge and expertise, the provision 
                                                          
169
 Moellendorf, (2009), p. 66 
170
 Moellendorf, (2009), p. 35 
171
Sibylle Scheipers & Daniela Sicurelli
, 
(2008), p. 608 
172
 Sibylle Scheipers & Daniela Sicurelli
,  
(2008), p. 623 
  
44 
of enhanced development chances and/or trade opportunities and the transfer of material resources. 
Most often it empowers the providing as well as the receiving end
173
. From this point of view the 
EU focuses on areas where they are the capable ones, the ones holding the structural power, but this 
is neither good nor bad, rather it is a dual empowering act. 
       To be able to answer the research-question, and conclude whether or not institutional justice is 
present in the FSTP, we need to establish whether or not the targeted area, in this case Sub-Saharan 
Africa, finds this just. Therefore we now move on to an analysis of the AU’s approach to food 
security issues.  
5. The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
      In this chapter there will be a focus on the food security programme, and the issues it highlights, 
posed by the African Union. To know their interests and priorities are important factors to be able to 
establish whether or not the FSTP can be labelled institutional just or not. Institutional justice is, as 
argued in section 2.3.1, based on justification.  
      Moellendorf argues that respect for persons requires affirming rules that could be justified as 
reasonable to the persons affected. An apparently direct way to establish whether or not it is 
reasonable to the persons affected would be that of hypothetical consent. Moellendorf underscores 
that some filtering of reasons is preferable, since otherwise persons might in fact be convinced on 
unreasonable considerations. Otherwise there is a risk that persons might endorse rules on no other 
grounds than that the rules benefit themselves, or that persons’ preferences might have been adapted 
to a narrow set of opinions, or persons’ understanding of what they deserve might have been 
deluded by false consciousness, so that they in fact endorse rules that fail to provide them with what 
they should reasonably expect
174
. For these reasons it is important to look at both how the AU itself 
argues that the food security situation shall be solved, as well as the power-relations that may be 
present and potentially affect the justifications and levels of consent in relations to international 
food security-issues. 
5.1 Agriculture on the development agenda 
      In 2008, as a respond to the global economic crisis and its impact on food-security, African 
leaders held a ‘Food Security Workshop Accelerating Investments in Response to High Food Prices 
and Food Insecurity’. Some of the points made during this workshop, was that the high food price 
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crisis was rooted in the fact that Africa spends billions annually on importing food and suffers 
negative terms of trade. African governments invest much less in the agricultural sector than 
developed countries do
175
. One of the thematic groups established was  on Agriculture and Food 
Security, comprising representatives of, amongst others, the AU, FAO, the World Bank, the African 
Development Bank, as well as several UN agencies, whom recommended the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAAD) as the framework for implementing the MDG 
Africa Initiative in agriculture and food security
176
. 
            Dependence on rain-fed agriculture and pervasive trade barriers induce extreme price 
volatility. In the face of erratic production, thin markets and frequent barriers to trade, seasonal 
price spreads of 50 percent are common. Food prices can easily vary by 100 percent from one year 
to the next. 
      It is stated that the inadequate performance of African agriculture is linked to challenges related 
to (1) markets (2) natural resource management and (3) technology development and uptake
177
. 
      Simultaneously, the AU states that the international community is less willing to invest in 
disaster risk reduction than it is in disaster response when crises break out, and that barriers to 
cross-border trade are sometimes significant, potentially exacerbating food shortages and worsening 
crises
178
. 
    
5.3 The Programme and its priorities  
      In 2003, African leaders endorsed the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) to put agriculture back onto the development agenda
179
. 
      The CAADP Framework for African Food Security (FAFS) presents the first and only 
continentally agreed on plan of action for addressing food insecurity and hunger, drafted by a team 
of predominantly African experts concerned with solving hunger and poverty in Africa
180
. 
      The FAFS is intended to provide sound guidance on policy, strategies and actions, as well as it 
is intended as an advocacy tool that can offer leaders increased access to political, technical, 
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methodological and financial support for their food security-related policies, plans and 
institutions
181
. 
       
       The CAADP, as a common framework for agricultural development and growth for African 
countries, is based on the following: 
 the principle of agriculture-led growth as a main strategy to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goal of poverty reduction; 
 the pursuit of 6 percent average annual agricultural growth at the national level; 
 the allocation of 10 percent of national budgets to the agricultural sector; 
 the exploitation of regional complementarities and cooperation to boost growth; 
 the principles of policy efficiency, dialogue, review, and accountability; 
 the principles of partnerships and alliances to include farmers, agribusiness, and civil-
society communities; and 
 Implementation principles that assign roles and responsibilities for program implementation 
to individual countries, coordination to designated regional economic communities (RECs), 
and facilitation to the NEPAD Secretariat
182
. 
 
It is argued that a successful implementation of the agenda calls for:  
 Raising and sustaining performance in traditional and foreign export markets, by seeking 
stronger partnerships between the local agribusiness sector and other agribusiness operators 
as well as working toward establishing agricultural trade agreements with other emerging 
economies
183
. 
 Strengthen regional and national negotiation capacities, preferably organized around RECs 
in order to accelerate the reform of protectionist global policies and safeguard African 
interests in international trade agreements
184
. 
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5.3.1 Governance of food-security 
      the AU argues for a better governance of food security by clearly defining the role of the state, 
the private sector, and the role of public– private partnerships in policies, program design, 
implementation, and funding; establishing institutional tools to harmonize regional policies and 
regulations related to infrastructure, using the European Union’s experience as a possible model; 
improving the investment climate and business environment, including the creation of the necessary 
legal system to minimize corruption at all levels, among both local and external actors
185
. 
 
What we can see here, when comparing the AU approach to food security with the EU’s, is that 
there are lots of similarities regarding priorities and believed reasons for the situation, as well as 
what should be done to enhance long-term development. Especially the fact that the AU endorses 
the long-term approach rather than quick fixes is in line with the EU’s approach. The same can be 
said, to a certain extent, about the question of ownership. The difference here is laying primarily in 
the role of the one who has ability; in the EU’s documents the Unions ability to empower is 
emphasised, whereas in the AU’s documents it seems more to be a question of empowering oneself, 
with support from others. The difference can seem irrelevant, but it can also be interpreted as 
different views on the internal power-relation. Who has the power to instigate change? 
      When it comes to governance of food security-issues, the AU states that the European model is 
an attractive frame to follow, in terms of regionalisation of issues related to the infrastructures that 
affect food security. This strongly indicates a just institutional approach by the EU, since it is clear 
that the receiving part chares the same interests, in line with what Moellendorf argues as a 
prerequisite for institutional justice.  
      The real difference is, as argued in the introduction, the question of trade. Whereas the FSTP 
does not emphasise this issue, the AU argues this to be one of the main reasons for the food security 
situation in Sub-Saharan Africa, and therefore one of the areas where change is needed for this 
thesis independent variable of the institutional frame of the EU food-security policy, as well as the 
dependent one on justice. When the EU mentions trade, it is primarily related to intra-African trade, 
and as we can see here, this is also an issue according to the AU, even one where the European 
model is set as an ideal.  
      The strong AU focus on involvement of stakeholders such as unions and civil society, as well as 
the focus on auditing and governance, is also in line with the core-values of the EU in general. This 
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indicates that these are issues universally agreed to be of importance for development, rather than a 
case of direct structural power. 
       
 
 5.4 Trade 
     As mentioned in the introduction, as well as in chapter 4 and 5, trade is one of the issues where 
there are visible different approaches between the AU and the EU. The level of importance one 
places on trade in food security is clearly not the same in the unions. As seen in the chapter on 
WTO, section 3.2, there are in general divided opinions on this issue, at the international level as 
well. But what is important in this thesis, is not so much whether or not trade is in fact important in 
relations to long-term socio-economic development through agriculture, but rather if the approach 
the EU has chosen, can be deemed institutional just.  
    Given the declining per capita production, imports account for a growing share of African food 
supplies. Low population density,
186
 long distances, poor infrastructure and limited competition 
imply high marketing costs, equally due to marketing constraints as low farm productivity. 
Furthermore, vacillating policies affecting agricultural markets generate uncertainties that raise 
costs and discourage private sector investment in marketing systems
187
. 
 
5.4.1 Trade within Africa 
      Trade is not limited to trade between units situated in distant parts of the world, and trade in 
development issues need not be limited to trade between the “developed” and the “developing” 
world. Considerable cross-border trade occurs, also regionally within Africa. 
       Between the years 2001-2004 it counted for 7.5 percent of total exports. Intra-African trade in 
agricultural products was also about twice the level of non-agricultural products during the same 
period for both exports and imports. However, much of this intra-African trade is informal, due to a 
range of government controls that limit cross-border exchange. 
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      It is argued in the programme that the failure by the international society to allow regional trade 
in food staples, risks stalling production growth and private investment in agriculture in the long 
run
188
. 
      As a long-term objective, African governments should seek to use local food resources for food 
assistance programmes, either through sales to the agencies that run them, or through the use of 
food vouchers that programme beneficiaries will redeem in local markets, to strengthen local 
agriculture
189
. 
 
5.4.2 International trade 
      Africa was a net food exporter during the 1960s but now imports, to give an example, 20 
percent of its cereal consumption. In 2002-04, Africa’s trade deficit in food amounted to $9 billion 
– a deficit that has been growing in recent years. Given the widespread hunger and malnutrition on 
the continent, these high levels of agricultural imports would appear to be only partially filling the 
consumption needs of a population lacking purchasing power. Moreover, governments and 
humanitarian agencies face important challenges in design and implementation of food assistance 
programmes that promote long-term development
190
. 
      On trade policy, export restrictions and taxes will aggravate price increases, encourage 
smuggling and impoverish local farmers, whilst lowering import tariffs might help but will reduce 
revenues. The dilemma is how to protect the poor without jeopardizing macroeconomic stability
191
. 
 
What we can see here, in the arguments from the AU, is that trade is the area where there are slight 
differences compared to the EU’s approach to food security-issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. The EU 
emphasises intra-African trade as the area where anti-distorting institutional changes are needed, 
and the AU concurs. The difference lays in the issue of international trade-distortions; where these 
are argued, by the EU, to be removed through the WTO-framework, the AU seems to disagree that 
this has happened yet, since they also focus on enhanced negotiation-capacity related to these 
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questions, on an international level, as a premise for enhancing development. Thereby the AU 
recognises the institutional power that they, in this case, are not holders of.  
       According to the World Bank most of the gains from the comprehensive Doha scenario, in the 
developing world, would go to large countries. Apart from South Africa, the World Bank foresees a 
potential scenario where some of the least developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
elsewhere may be slight losers, when developed countries cut their tariffs if those LDC’s choose not 
to reform. Their losses result from weakening their terms of trade because of erosion of tariff 
preferences affecting their exports or, if they are net food importers, because they would face higher 
prices on imports of temperate food, as well as the trade-dampening effect of complex rules of 
origin that will not change. The World Bank then states that these preference-receiving countries 
could be compensated for preference erosion through increased aid at relatively small cost to 
current preference providers
192
. If the World Bank is right in this potential scenario, then the current 
WTO-rules could be argued to be more just, since the positive discrimination that currently is 
allowed, would fit well in the exceptions to pro tanto equality, that are acceptable within 
Moellendorf’s framework of institutional justice.  
      What can be concluded by the World Banks suggestion for compensation -if the Doha-round 
turns out to give the LDC’s the foreseen problems -is that this would be a most unfortunate turn, in 
terms of power-relations between the LDC’s and “the west”. To make them more dependent on aid 
would not be empowering in the sense that is currently a priority within the international debate on 
food security. It would enhance the power to towards this region, and potentially also the power 
over, by making them more dependent on aid, instead of securing African ownership of its 
development-path. 
 
7. Institutional justice in the EU’s approach to food security 
      In this chapter I seek to connect the analyses from previous chapters, to provide an answer to the 
research-question on to what extent the EU’s approach to food security can be argued to be ethical. 
      As stated in section 2.3.2, the prerequisite for demands on institutional justice is, according to 
Moellendorf, that the association generates effects with scope and force to structure a person’s life.  
The demands for associations are that they are (i) relatively strong, (ii) largely non-voluntary, (iii) 
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constitutive of a significant part of the background rules for the various relationships of their public 
lives and (iv) governed by norms that can be subject to human control. With respect to (i), an 
association is strong to the extent that it is (a) enduring, (b) comprehensively governed by 
institutional norms and (c) regularly affecting the highest order moral interests of the persons 
associated. What we want is to secure that actions taken in the association is directed toward 
ensuring that differences in initial condition do not affect the opportunities of persons. Whether or 
not this is the case, can be difficult to assess, and to complicate it even further, Moellendorf argues 
that a person’s participation in an association is not always non-voluntary to a sufficient degree. 
     As an example he uses membership of a particular church; they are not governed by duties for 
justice in liberal societies, since in such societies persons typically have reasonable alternatives to 
memberships in any particular church or in any church at all
193
. This may not be the case in other 
types of societies; therefore the effect on a person’s life as well as the level of non-voluntariness is 
of importance to be able to establish whether or not the association generates duties of institutional 
justice.  
      As stated several times previously in this thesis, amongst others in chapter 1.1, the EU is of 
great importance to Sub-Saharan Africa, both in terms of trade and aid, being the biggest donor and 
trade-partner. This indicates that the relations between these two unions’ have a high degree of 
influence on the population, and by that it is of importance to secure institutional justice in the 
programme.  
      The fact that productive power combined with normative convergence, has made it, in practice, 
impossible to choose another path for development, than the one the EU sets out, especially taking 
the importance of the EU for this region into consideration. Therefore we can conclude that this 
relationship fulfil the requirements for being sufficiently strong to be labelled an association which 
creates demands on institutional justice.  
       
7.1 Can the EU approach to food security then be labelled just? 
         Since we now have established that the FSTP is, at least a part of, an association of the kind 
which creates demands on justice, we can now move on to how this justice is detected.  
 As previously stated, primarily in section 2.2, ethical in this thesis is related to the concept of 
institutional justice. To be able to detect whether or not an institution is just, equality has to be 
present, as seen in section 2.3.1.  
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      The argument on equality and justice in distributive associations has, according to Moellendorf, 
both Universalist and contextualist-interpretive elements.  
      The Universalist element is the norm of respect for the dignity of persons. This we have 
established, in accordance with the arguments in section 2.5.2; I do not wish to analyse whether or 
not these norms are in fact universal or not, I wish to establish what the consequences of how we 
use this norm, are. 
      The contextualist-interpretive elements are threefold. The first is to establish whether or not we 
are co-members of the same association of the requisite kind. This was established in the 
introduction to this chapter, and is of importance since we do not owe duties of political justice to 
others than co-associates.  
      The second element involves validating the claim that the association is a common good 
association
194
. That is what was described in section 2.3.2 as an association that by the joint effort 
of its members produces goods and powers, useful to the members, to which no person has a pre-
associational moral entitlement. This can be harder to settle, since it is based upon if it is more of a 
political or economic institution.  
      Moellendorf argues that in political institutions, removing it from the socio-economic 
association with which it co-exists, then distributive demands of equal respect often tends in the 
direction of sufficientarianism
195. Sufficientarianism is closely related to Pogge’s take on 
institutional justice, which was described in section 2.3.3, and thus limited to that the institutions 
should do no harm. Now, there is a difference in avoid doing harm and instigate development. The 
latter is what the EU seeks to do in its FSTP, and this correlates to the AU approach as well. 
Moellendorf argues that the global institutions we have today which provide the sufficient 
conditions for holding obligations of duties of distributive justice are far from succeeding in this
196
. 
But he speaks of institutions on a global level, such as the World Bank, the WTO and the UN, 
whereas the EU is a region, acting in a globalised world. Therefore we need to establish whether or 
not the EU, when it comes to the FSTP acts more like an economic actor. According to 
Moellendorf, an economic association involves the organization of the division of labour and 
entitlements to capital assets. It also directs the deployment of labour and capital for the production 
of goods and services that benefit its members
197
. Since these issues are of great importance to the 
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life prospects of participators in the system, the moral ideal of reciprocity exists only if the terms of 
cooperation are fair and reasonable
198
. Drawing on the analyses from chapter 3-5, this will be 
established in the following chapters. 
      The third element that needs to be established is what justice is about in the association
199
. What 
are the goods (taken broadly to include powers) of an association that justice regulates? 
Moellendorf argues for the interpretive tasks to be primarily about the goods of justice and the ideal 
of equality that regulates the goods, not about the distributive principle
200
. This is also the reason for 
looking at principles governing the FSTP, instead of looking at the projects it has funded. I am 
interested in the principles of the programme and whether or not they are just, whereas future 
projects will establish the outcome of the specific projects funded within the frame of the 
programme. 
      It is important to bear in mind that the institutions of an association do not affect only the 
economic interests of persons, but the general capacity of persons to live lives that are in significant 
ways chosen. Hence it is implausibly narrow to limit the requirements of reciprocity in an economic 
association only to considerations of distributive justice
201
. This is why power-relations as well are 
of interest in this thesis. Reciprocity is in other words also related to capabilities and powers. 
 
7.2 differences in the AU’s and the EU’s approaches to food security 
      As we have seen throughout this thesis the AU’s and the EU’s approach to how to meet the 
long-term socio-economic development-goals related to food security, is in most part rather similar. 
Both highlight, in line with the global consensus on the area, issues like capacity-building, 
agriculture as the primus motor area, a stronger intra-continental market, and a heightened focus on 
food security governance which includes building stronger bonds between different stake-holders. 
Apart from that, both have a strong focus on African ownership of the development-plans, as 
crucial parts to secure development.  
       One of the differences detected was, as elaborated on in section 5.3.1, the underlying power-
relations in the way this empowerment is spoken of. The EU positions itself as the one who can 
provide this, and by that the Union anchors its productive power in this relationship, by categorizing 
itself as the capable that can empower the weaker one, whereas the AU establishes that this 
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empowerment is to come from within, with support from the international society, and thus 
positions itself at a more equal level with the latter. 
      As seen in section 2.3.2, equal respect for persons does not preclude that equality cannot be 
suspended, if the parties agree. When it comes to global policy-making Moellendorf argues that the 
value of equality of opportunity will have to be set off against the value of self-determination. 
Neither can be fully realized, but both must be recognized, and that wise global policy can proceed 
by balancing the respective values
202
. But it is important to prevent institutionally conferred 
privileges derived merely from familiar background or natural talents
203
. In other words institutional 
justice can only be present if institutional settings are not based on institutional and/or productive 
power. 
      This power-approach to institutional justice became most evident in the subject on trade, as seen 
in section 3.2 and chapter 5. Here we saw how these diffuse types of power are, at least by some, 
argued to be features of the global institutional settings on trade, in favour of the EU and with, 
mostly, negative consequences for the Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore the following parts will focus 
on trade and justice.  
      According to Moellendorf, the globalization of trade, investment and finance has had profound 
effects on the highest order interests of persons and that regardless of whether persons are directly 
engaged with the global economy; they will be profoundly affected by international trade
204
. 
      The EU acknowledges that trade has a role in international food security, and the argument here 
is that the Union should support standardisation and harmonisation of policies, rules and 
regulations, towards regionally integrated agricultural policies
205
, as was also evident throughout 
chapter 4. In other words the EU argues for legal justice, as described in section 3.2. Moral justice –
securing just institutional settings acceptable to all participants of the association- is seen as fulfilled 
by the EU, through the reform of the CAP, as seen in section 4.5, even though it is evident in 
chapter 5, that this view is not entirely shared by the AU. By referring to legal justice, it can be 
argued that the EU uses its institutional power in relations to the WTO, and its productive power in 
its communication towards the SSA, to establish legal justice as the justice. 
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      African perceptions of the EU and its role in Africa are ambivalent. The foreign policy identify 
of the EU manifesting its values are, to a certain extent, supported. But generally the findings in the 
trade-sector are that the EU is seen as a protectionist power, using instruments of coercion in 
negotiations
206
. This corresponds to the findings in section 3.2, where the UN Special Rapporteur 
argued that food security is treated like a ‘bargaining chip’. This is a then a rather clear use of 
compulsory power, and not in line with the demands for institutional justice. But, as Scmidt argues, 
the new partnership-alternatives for African states have lead to stronger resistance against western 
policies and weaker effects of conditionality
207
. This may not be as clear within WTO-negotiations, 
where the EU from the African view clearly still holds institutional power, but as we saw in chapter 
5, south-south trade is increasing. So in this area there may be argued to be alternatives, even 
though these are more theoretical than practical, since the EU is still by far the largest market for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. But regarding trade-rules the association is so strong that there is no real 
alternative.   
 
7.3.1 The moral importance of international trade 
      As stated in the preceding chapter, the WTO and the EU’s justice approach to development-
related trade-issues, is that of legal justice. Moellendorf argues that a rules-based multi-lateral 
regime is superior on anti-predation grounds. Although rules that permit protectionism in developed 
countries violate the principle of fair equality of opportunity, a multi-lateral trade regime that links 
liberalized market access to the observance of core labour standards can, in his opinion, be morally 
justified
208
, since this will better secure the developing world, as opposed to if they where to 
negotiate on bilateral agreements.  
      Related to trade is also the principle of fair-play; suppose a person receives benefits from the 
activity of others, but not to the degree that he/she agrees that it is worth the costs of participating. 
Associational justice creates duties of justice, which duties are not necessarily to act according to 
the existing institutional rules
209
. In other words we have to establish whether or not the parties 
think of the programme as just, and whether or not the exceptions from equality there might be 
agreed on, makes it worth participating or not.  
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8. Conclusion 
      The outset of this thesis was to analyse the level of institutional justice and power-relations in 
the Food Security Thematic Programme, to be able to detect to what extent the EU approach to this 
issue, can be argued to be ethical. As described in the introduction, ethics is often seen as something 
situated within the field of philosophy, at the abstract level that can be hard to develop into 
something that can be of practical use. Apart from that, ethics is traditionally, within international 
relations, seen as something belonging in the category of nice-to-have, instead of in need-to-have. 
Alas, when employing highly abstract notions of ethics, one of the challenges lies within 
establishing why it is of importance at all.  
      I started out by referring to the world of superheroes, a fictional universe where the ones 
holding powers are often very clear heroes or villains; it is clear who holds power, and what they 
use these powers for, for good or for bad.  
      When it comes to the real world, nothing is as clear-cut as this; neither regarding doing good or 
bad, nor regarding how abstract theories of ethics are applied.  
      The EU wishes to be a “force for good” in the world, to be the ethical player on the global field, 
and therefore its foreign policies emphasises the core values of the Union, as well as empowerment 
of its partners and securing functioning institutional settings based on its own experience. The EU 
believes in shared values and cooperation in decision-making. This is evident in the discourse on 
the topic of food security, where the EU enhances the idea of African ownership on its path towards 
socio-economic development. To secure this the Union seeks to be coherent with the international 
consensus on what long-term socio-economic development in general, and Sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular, demands, as well as it seeks coherence in its own policies affecting these issues.  
      Food security is, by the international society, seen as an important component of a secure global 
community, since hunger is recognised as one of the most wide-spread threats towards stability and 
development. It is argued to be correlated with conflict, disease, migration and terrorism. Lessons 
learnt from the past has lead the international society to, at least in theory, prioritise long-term 
socio-economic development, mainly through a heightened focus on agriculture, in the fight against 
food insecurity, instead of the traditional focus on emergency-aid.  
      The EU strives to be in the forefront of this development. The Union is the main donor of 
development-aid to the region of Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as its main trading-partner. 
  
57 
      Since the EU is an actor emphasising both the institutional settings and values of its 
development-policies, at the same time as it seeks to maximise the outcome and do “good” in the 
world, it is hard to directly apply one of the traditional ethics-theories on its approach to food 
security. This is not surprising, since as argued, reality seldom is as black and white as neither 
theory, nor fiction. Therefore the analytical frame for this thesis has been a combination of the 
institutional justice approach by Darrel Moellendorf and the four types of power identified by 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. Together, these two theoretical approaches provided an 
analytical approach where the global economic association and the power-relations inherent in this, 
was applied to the EU-Sub-Saharan Africa relations.  
     By doing this, the level of justice has been dependent on how the target of the Food Security 
Thematic Programme views it, as well as by how these perceptions are produced. Since, as 
Moellendorf argues, institutional justice can only be present if both parties agree on the approach to 
it, and that this is not done because there is no real alternative - thus being an expression of power -
but it should be based on presumed equality.  
      It can be argued that the weakness of this approach is that it is closely tied to liberal democracy, 
and by being that it in a sense favours both structural and productive power for this type of political 
governance. Even though the goal has not been to favour this, the theory of institutional justice 
assumes this as the proper political governance. I cannot argue that I disagree, but contrasting it to 
something less dependent on this, would perhaps have provided a different outcome. Even within 
theories of institutional justice, this might have happened. As mentioned in the thesis, Pogge 
focuses on the absence of doing harm, and by applying that theory it may be that one could argue 
that the FSTP is just. But sole harm-preventing is not what the EU promotes; development is. 
Therefore I believe the chosen approach to institutional justice to function well as an analytical tool, 
and when combining it with the four types of power, some of the potential weaknesses have been 
detected throughout the analysis.  
      To be able to establish whether or not the institutional arrangement can be said to be just, both 
the EU’s and the African Union’s approach to food security has been analysed. It was clear from the 
start that on most issues the approaches are rather similar, and that trade was the main area of 
asymmetry. But this is not necessarily enough to establish that the FSTP is unjust. There are 
plausible exceptions for equality embedded in the institutional justice-theory, in so far as the parties 
agree that these are acceptable. To be able to establish this, the international trade-regulations and 
the power-relations these contain was analysed.  
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      The international trade-regime can be argued to taking steps towards institutional justice, but it 
is not there yet. Even though the slow Doha-negotiations and the increased south-south trade has 
somewhat changed the power-relations in this organisation, the institutional, as well as structural, 
power lies stronger with the ‘west’ than with the ‘rest’, and above all, there is in reality no 
alternative to membership of this association, and therefore it has obligations of justice.  
      The EU argues that changes in the CAP as well as its trade-rules, has abolished trade-distorting. 
But what can be argued here is that the Union favours legal justice, instead of moral justice. The 
AU does not explicitly state that the EU, or any other actor, has strong institutional powers in 
relations to the WTO, but it does emphasise its own need for enhancing its negotiation-capacities on 
an international level, thus indicating that it does not parallel legal justice with moral justice.  
      Even with this in mind, Moellendorf argues that a rules-based multi-lateral regime is superior to 
bilateral agreements on anti-predation grounds, since he believes that this will better secure the 
developing world, as opposed to if they where to negotiate on bilateral agreements. This can be 
argued to be correct with the current negotiations-round and the influence by the G-20 on this, but 
at the same time it is also evident that even though this may have resulted in food security 
functioning less like a bargaining-chip, and thereby removing the compulsory power-element of it, 
it is still evident that the institutional and productive power is strongly situated where it traditionally 
has been.  
      Relating this to the EU’s approach to food security, from an ethical perspective, it is clear that 
the norms the EU promotes have reached a status of universal, at least within the global institutional 
settings, as well as these are present in and promoted by the African Union approach to food 
security. From that point of view it can be argued that the EU’s approach to food security contains a 
high degree of institutional justice. But at the same time it is also evident that the way the EU’s 
trade and CAP-policies in themselves are perceived -as well as the way the use of the EU’s power-
position within these areas are perceived- these are clearly neither corresponding to that of being a 
‘force for good’ in the world, nor to the self-perceived identity of being an ethical actor.   
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